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Abstract: For over a century, courts and commentators have struggled to ¯nd
principles that reconcile patent and antitrust law, especially as to patent licensing.
Attempts by the US Supreme Court to develop broad per se rules were largely aban-
doned by the 1940s. Since then, courts have increasingly adopted a \rule-of-reason"
a p p r o a c hi nw h i c he a c hc a s ei sd e c i d e do ni t so w np a r t i c u l a rf a c t s . H o w e v e r ,t h i s
approach is also unsatisfying since it remains almost entirely ad hoc.I nt h i sp a p e rw e
suggest that the Supreme Court's original, per se agenda should be revitalized. We
interpret case law and commentary to arrive at three unifying principles for acceptable
terms of license. Pro¯t neutrality holds that patent rewards should not depend on
the rightholder's ability to work the patent himself. Derived reward holds that the
patent holder's pro¯ts should be earned, if at all, from the social value created by
the invention. Minimalism holds that licensing contracts should not contain more
restrictions than are necessary to achieve neutrality. We show that these principles
largely rationalize important decisions of the twentieth century, including the Supreme
Court's General Electric decision, and contrast their prescription with rule-of-reason
analysis.
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JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: K21, L12, L24, L41
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Patent law and antitrust concerns were born side by side. On the one hand, The
Statute of Monopolies (1623) announced a general ban on monopolies \for the sole
Buying, Selling, Making, Working or Using of any Thing within this Realm." On
the other, it created new monopolies as an incentive for inventions. The decision to
treat the same legal concept { monopoly { as a crime in one case and a reward in the
other presents unique problems for judges. \[B]ecause the patentee's authority is an
island of permission in a sea of prohibition, there is no area at the edge of permission
to which the law is indi®erent: what is not authorized is forbidden." (Baxter 1966).
Expanded antitrust enforcement during the twentieth century has made this problem
increasingly acute.
Over the past century, courts and commentators have explored many di®erent
proposals for de¯ning the boundary between intellectual property from antitrust law.
The simplest approach, \inherency," resolves the issue by allowing one body of law to
dominate the other in any con°ict (Adelman and Juenger 1975). Early in the twenti-
eth century, patent law dominated so that restrictive licenses were generally upheld.
During the 1960s, some commentators urged a di®erent version of inherency that
would have made antitrust dominant (Kaplow 1984). Although generally disfavored,
inherency arguments are still being made (Gi®ord 2002; Patterson 2000).
The alternative to inherency is balancing. However, if antitrust and patent
law have di®erent objectives, it is not obvious how to strike a balance. For this
reason, most commentators have advocated balancing according to a single, agreed-
upon objective such as \wealth creation" or \consumer welfare" (Bork 1965, 1978;
Bowman 1973). But even with a single, common objective, asking the courts to
balance ex ante incentives against ex post deadweight loss is a serious burden. Instead,
almost all cases and commentators argue that courts should infer the correct balance
from Congress's intent as codi¯ed in the patent laws.
There are many di®erent ways to divine intent. Twentieth century judges and
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are two schools. The earliest, which dates from the 1920s, seeks to develop clear per
se rules that can be applied more or less mechanically. Courts following this tradition
have approved restrictions on licensees' prices (General Electric 1926), on licensees'
customers (General Talking Pictures 1938; Schlicher 2002, 11:193) and on licensees's
geographic markets (Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley 2004, at 33:18). Over time, the
Supreme Court seems to have lost con¯dence in the per se agenda. In fact, the Court
came within one vote of overruling General Electric in 1947 and again in 1964. Lower
courts have also adopted exceptions,1 to the point where many commentators argue
that General Electric is a \vestige" that \prudent" practitioners should not rely on
(Weinschel 2000, at 2:47; Kaplow 1984). Nevertheless, it remains the law of the land.
The second school, dominant since the 1940s, argues for a more °exible \rule-
of-reason" standard.2 Courts currently use rule of reason for a wide variety of license
restrictions (Weinschel 2000 at 2:90). However, this program has yet to develop any
widely-recognized principles or rules for deciding cases. At its worst, \rule of reason"
can be little more than a label disguising \amorphous" and \freewheeling" standards.
(Juenger & Adelman 1975) Since the 1980s, however, scholars have thought hard
about the inquiries that any principled rule of reason approach must resolve.
Despite occasional claims of an \emerging paradigm" (Gi®ord 2002), most
commentators agree that current law is unsatisfactory (Kaplow 1984). In the words
1For example, General Electric may not apply to the unpatented product of a patented machine
(Weinschel 2000 at 2:46, 2:95-96; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 31:27-29), to patentholders with
multiple licensees (Weinschel 2000, 2:107 & n. 19; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 31:817-18), to
patentholders who do not manufacture the patented item (Schlicher 2002 11:179; Hovenkamp, et. al.,
2004, at 31:20; Royal Industries 1969), to licenses that are said to \predominantly bene¯t" licensees
rather than the patentholder (Weinschel 2000, 2:107; Ethyl 1940), to licenses where the patent does
not \completely cover" the product (Schlicher 2002 11:179; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 31:25), to
patentholders who acquire their rights by purchase rather than internal R&D (Hovenkamp, et. al.,
2004, at 31:19), or to intellectual property rights other than patents (Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at
31:30-35; Interstate Circuit 1939).
2Although we ¯nd it convenient to speak of per se and rule of reason approaches as opposites,
the truth is considerably more complicated. The Supreme Court has warned that "there is often no
bright line separating per se from rule of reason analysis." (California Dental Assn. 1984). Instead,
judges who apply rule of reason must still be guided by our general knowledge of economic theory.
(Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2003). Conversely, judges must be prepared to change per se rules, however
reluctantly, as knowledge and experience accumulate. (Id.)
2
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clear and general theory for resolving this inquiry. Thus, individual problems are
resolved in a piecemeal fashion, and it is di±cult to harmonize decisions in one area
(such as price restrictions) with another (such as ¯eld of use restrictions)." (Chisum
2001) This doctrinal confusion has practical consequences. Blue ribbon panels have
complained since the 1950s that legal uncertainty deters patentees from licensing their
inventions. (See Hensley 1967.)
I nt h i sp a p e rw et a k eaf r e s hl o o ka tt h eper se agenda, focusing mainly on
the problem posed by General Electric { patent licenses featuring price restrictions.
We start by stating three principles suggested { or at least consistent with { the
case law and commentary that have developed over the past half-century. We see
these principles as a normative foundation for addressing the patent/antitrust con°ict,
whether to justify per se rules, or to guide a rule-of-reason analysis. Needless to say,
the motivating problem of price ¯xing does not exhaust the list of situations where
antitrust and patent laws collide,3 and our three principles may not be useful in every
instance. However, we show that they also apply to some provocative cases that
involve improvement patents.
We call our ¯rst principle pro¯t neutrality. Pro¯t neutrality means that the
patentee's opportunity to pro¯t should not depend on his ability to work the patent.
His ability to work the patent may depend on such accidents of history as whether he
owns manufacturing facilities, is liquid, or has access to ¯nancing. Licensing may be
the only way to overcome such limitations.
Our second principle, which we call the derived-reward principle, holds that the
patent holder must earn her reward, if at all, from the social value of the invention. For
example, the Supreme Court has often struck down patent licenses that monopolize
markets unrelated to the invention, so-called sham licenses.
3Prominent examples include tying, ¯eld of use and geographic restrictions, package licensing,
post-expiration royalties, grant-back provisions, the ¯rst sale doctrine, restrictions on users' right to
repair of patented machines, settlement agreements, and agreements that extend rights beyond the
scope of the antitrust laws.
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contain more restrictions than are required to achieve pro¯t neutrality. Minimalism
recognizes that it is hard to detect cartels and that super°uous license restrictions
facilitate illegal conspiracies.
Section 2 explains how the three princples relate to case law and commentary.
In section 3, we analyse the licensing of a product patent, as in General Electric. In
section 4 we consider product enhancements or additives as in Ethyl Gasoline and Line
Material. In section 5 we list three possible per se rules and analyse their strengths
and weaknesses. In section 6 we compare rule of reason's strengths and weaknesses
with a revived per se approach. Section 7 is a short conclusion.
2. Support for the Three Principles
Pro¯t Neutrality. By the 1920s, the Supreme Court had abandoned the inherency
view that a patent holder could impose whatever license restrictions he desired. When
the Court concluded that at least one license restriction (tying) violated the antitrust
laws, they opened the door to questioning others. Which restrictions should be
legal and which not? The General Electric opinion announced a new standard: In
order to be lawful, license restrictions would have to be \reasonably adapted to secure
pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly." (General Electric 1926) Many courts
and commentators have taken this phrase to mean that the patentee is entitled to a
\speci¯c level of aggregate reward" (Kaplow 1984). In our view, however, a better and
more plausible interpretation is that courts should ask whether the patentee's methods
are reasonable while remaining agnostic about whether the amount of the reward
is reasonable. Commentators have also stressed that an ability to exploit patents
through licensing is needed to reward small independent inventors and businesses,
discourage ine±cient integration, and put production in the hands of the most e±cient
manufacturer (Landes & Posner 2003; Bowman 1973; Bork 1967).4
4To the best of our knowledge, Professor Baxter (1966) is the only commentator who has stated
pro¯t neutrality in substantially the same form adopted here: \[I]t could be said, the economic
value of the invention is best measured by the extent of restriction and pro¯ts that would attend
4
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rewards should be the same as if the patent holder had the ability to work the patent
e±ciently himself. This allows us to measure licenses against the benchmark of what
the rightholder could hypothetically earn through complete vertical integratation if he
controlled the e±cient means of production.
Of course, to evaluate whether a given license term is required for pro¯t-
neutrality, the court needs to assess the market consequences with and without the
disputed term of license. Ideally, courts would rely on economic experts, but this is a
fallible process. The economic reasoning in General Electric was clearly inadequate.
The Court paraphrased the rightholder's goals as, \Yes, you may make and sell articles
under my patent, but not so as to destroy the pro¯t that I wish to obtain by making
and selling them myself." As Bowman (1973) has remarked, \surely it is net receipts
that should interest General Electric rather than the sheer accounting joy of attribut-
ing pro¯ts to its own manufacturing operations."5 W h e t h e ro rn o tp r o ¯ tn e u t r a l i t y
was in the Court's mind, they almost certainly lacked the economics modeling tools
to implement it.
Derived Reward. Judges have opined that a license cannot be used to create
a monopoly on any product other than the invention itself (Id. at 11:34); that \[t]he
patentee is entitled to exact the full value of his invention but is not entitled to
endanger competition in other areas by manipulating his patent monopoly" (Bement
1902); and that the patent monopoly should exclude \all that is not embraced in the
invention" (Morton Salt 1942). In fact, any other stance would be unconstitutional.
Neither Congress nor the courts can give a patentee \more than the rewards of his
discovery" (Hensley 1967; Line Material 1948 (Douglas concurring)).
Since the 1960s, commentators have struggled to give a precise economic mean-
direct patentee exploitation; and to prevent the patentee from capturing a part of these incremental
pro¯ts by splitting them with licensees on whom he has conferred sheltered positions is to deprive the
patentee of part of that value." After stating it, Baxter rejected this argument because he believed
that companies that held strong patents would always prefer vertical integration to licensing. Hence,
any licenses that did exist were likely to be shams. Baxter's view followed from his conclusion that
licensors could not recover 100% of its licensees' pro¯t. We disagree.
5Interestingly, the point was well known to contemporary economists. (Taussig 1916).
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utility the patented product provides to users (Baxter 1966), that rewards should
\measure[] the patented product's superiority over substitutes" (Bowman 1973), \never
compensat[ing] the patentee beyond the value of his invention to society" (Adelman
& Juenger 1975), and that steps should be taken to \ensure that the return on intel-
lectual property is related to its value" (Patterson 2000). Among other things, such
interpretations condemn sham licenses. In a sham license, the intellectual property
right is an excuse to create a cartel that would be pro¯table even if the invention had
no value.
An important nuance is in whether the court should be concerned with the
size of the reward or the source of the reward. Under our derived-reward principle,
the court should consider the source, not the size. If concerned with the size, the
court might allow terms of license that cartelize a pre-existing market, on a theory
that such cartelization is necessary to reimburse the innovator's costs. Such leniency
could subvert the incentive purpose of the patent grant. If the patentee cannot be
rewarded out of the value created, without putting users in a worse position than
before the innovation, then the innovation was probably not socially desirable in the
¯rst place. We admit, of course, that even under our derived-reward principle, socially
e±cient innovations may be underrewarded. If that is too common an occurrence,
then Congress should revise the design of the patent right.
The Supreme Court turned to this type of principle more and more frequently
in the 1940s, in part re°ecting a conviction that tying could be used improperly to
\leverage" the patent monopoly into new markets. Although the Court may have been
using faulty economics,6 commentators did not seriously challenge the prohibition on
tying until the late 1950s.
Minimalism. Even commentators who approve of licensing admit that it \sub-
stantially increase[s]" the danger that the parties will organize illegal cartels (Bowman
1973). The General Electric rule, which o®ers immunity for price ¯xing, would be a
6For a recent discussion of the tying fallacy, see Posner and Landes (2003).
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mate licensing (Ethyl 1940; Line Material 1948). Our minimalism principle asserts
that licenses should be limited to as few restrictions as are necessary to achieve pro¯t
neutrality.
Courts and commentators have implicitly invoked minimalism to strike down
license restrictions that they deem super°uous. For example, Shapiro (1979) argued
that the rightholder's power to restrict the sale of patented products should expire the
¯rst time a product is sold because \(t)he patentee can obtain the full reward of the
patent in the ¯rst sale; a right to restrict the goods in more remote channels of trade
is not a traditional part of the patent grant nor is it needed in order for the patentee
to fully enjoy the monopoly of the patent." (emphasis supplied) Stronger versions
of this argument have asserted that most license restrictions are invalid because \a
rational patent owner can extract the full monopoly reward by setting appropriate
royalties." Given this premise, additional restrictions in a license can only lead to
implicit cartelization or bribe competitors not to invent around or challenge weak
patents in court (Neal Report 1969).
3. Licensing New Products
We start by considering the original General Electric case, which concerned product
patents. Pro¯t neutrality implies that licensing should yield the same reward that a
patentee would earn if all production was performed e±ciently in-house. There are
many reasons why the patent holder may not be situated to serve the whole market,
such as that he cannot raise the money to build production or distribution facilities.
Pro¯t neutrality holds that the rightholder's reward should not depend on ownership
of the plants that produce and distribute his patented product.
We ¯rst analyze a benchmark case, that the rightholder supplies the entire
market directly. We then show that if all production is licensed to two licensees
who can jointly supply the market e±ciently, the patent holder can achieve the same
pro¯t using only ¯xed fees and per-unit royalties. Courts routinely approve ¯xed fees
7
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patent holder supplies the market in competition with a licensee. This is the case that
the Supreme Court faced in General Electric, and also in Line Material,i nas l i g h t l y
di®erent circumstance. We show below that ¯xed fees and per-unit royalties cannot
achieve e±cient production or pro¯t neutrality when the licensor competes with the
licensee and charges a royalty.
In what follows, we assume that the marginal cost of manufacturing is increas-
ing, and that e±cient production requires several plants instead of one. Accounting
for plant setup costs, we assume without loss of generality that the e±cient number of
production facilities is two. Suppose that the inverse demand curve (the willingness
to pay for the marginal unit at quantity q)i sd e ¯ n e db yp(q)=1¡ q; where q is the
total supply of all ¯rms.7 When two plants supply the market with quantities q1;q 2;
the market price will therefore be p(q1 +q2)=1¡ (q1 +q2): In this case the available




°(^ q)d^ q (3.1)
where °(¢) is the marginal cost curve in each facility. We ignore the ¯xed costs here,
assuming that they justify the use of two and only two facilities.
3.1. The Benchmark
First suppose that the rightholder owns both facilities, decides how much to supply,
earns all the revenue, and bears all the costs. The pro¯t-maximizing total supply q¤,
which maximizes (3.1), satis¯es the condition that marginal revenue equals marginal
7The easiest interpretation is that each agent buys a ¯xed amount of the good in each period,
which we shall understand as one unit. The potential buyers are indexed by their willingness to pay
µ 2 (0;1). If agent µ buys the good at price p; his utility is µ ¡ p.I f µ is uniformly distributed on
the interval (0;1); the number of agents for whom µ ¡ p>0i s1¡ p: If q units of the good are
supplied, the market-clearing price is 1 ¡ q; since that is the price that provides nonnegative utility
to the q buyers with µ>1 ¡q, but negative utility to the others.
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and the resulting pro¯t is p(q¤)q¤ ¡ 2°(q¤=2) ¡ 2C; where C is the ¯xed cost of each
production facility. This is the benchmark pro¯t for pro¯t neutrality.
3.2. Licensing Out All Production
Suppose instead that the patent holder relies on two licensees to supply the market.
Pro¯t is determined by the licensees' production decisions and shared with the licensor
through royalties and ¯xed fees, (½;F):
We consider Cournot competition in which each licensee chooses its supply
optimally assuming that the other ¯rm's supply as given. Our objective is to charac-
terize the equilibrium such that if neither ¯rm has an incentive to change its supply.
The equilibrium supplies will depend on the royalty rate ½. We will show that the







Conditional on the royalty ½, we will write pro¯t of ¯rm 1 as
(p(q1 + q2) ¡ ½) q1 ¡
Z q1
0
°(^ q)d^ q (3.5)
Firm 1 takes the supply of the other ¯rm, q2; as ¯xed, and optimizes by choice of its




(1 ¡ q2 ¡ ½ ¡ °(q1)) (3.6)
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(p(q1 + q2) ¡ ½) q2 ¡
Z q2
0
°(^ q)d^ q (3.7)




(1 ¡ q1 ¡ ½ ¡ °(q2)) (3.8)
Since the conditions (3:6) and (3.8) are satis¯ed at (q1;q 2)=( q¤=2;q¤=2) when ½ is
de¯ned by (3.4), the pro¯t-maximizing supplies (q¤=2;q ¤=2) are an equilibrium.
This assumes that the ¯xed fees are such that each licensee makes nonnegative
pro¯t. If (p¤ ¡ ½)(q¤=2) > 0 the ¯xed fees can be positive, but otherwise must be
negative. (If negative fees are not allowed, an equilibrium with two licensees cannot
be sustained.) The ¯xed fees together with royalties can thus sustain the pro¯t-
maximizing price and transfer all the pro¯t to the patent holder.
Thus, although patent holders have the right to impose quantity restrictions
on their licensees (Schlicher 2002; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 32:3), pro¯t neutrality
does not require such restrictions in cases where the entire supply is contracted out.
3.3. The Problem: Competition between Patentee and Licensee
We now show that if the patent holder operates one production facility and a licensee
operates another, per-unit ¯xed royalties and ¯xed fees cannot achieve pro¯t neutrality.
Additional license restrictions are required. A positive per-unit royalty is required
in order to keep the price up. But that makes the licensee's \e®ective" marginal
cost higher than that of the patent holder. Facing higher costs, the licensee will
produce less. Hence the true marginal cost of the last unit produced by the licensee is
less than the marginal cost of the last unit produced by the licensor; in this sense, the
equilibrium does not achieve productive e±ciency. Costs could be saved by decreasing
the licensor's production and increasing the licensee's production.
10
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and licensee. Suppose that the licensee pays (constant) royalty ½. The pro¯t of the
licensor, ¯rm 1, is




If the licensor takes the licensee's output q2 as given, and optimizes with respect to




(1 ¡ q2 ¡ °(q1)) (3.9)
The pro¯t of the licensee, ¯rm 2, is




If ¯rm 2 takes the licensor's output q1 as given, and optimizes with respect to q2; the




(1 ¡ q1 ¡ °(q2) ¡ ½) (3.10)
It follows from (3.9) and (3.10) that, in equilibrium,
q1 + °(q1)=q2 + ½ + °(q2) (3.11)
Since the two ¯rms will not produce the same quantities, the aggregate supply is not
produced e±ciently at any positive royalty rate. Conditional on (3.11), there may be
a royalty rate that supports the price p(q¤); but the licensor will still not receive the
maximum pro¯t, due to productive ine±ciency.
Another way to see that the licensor and licensee will supply di®erent quantities
is to notice that after the royalty agreement is in place, the licensor will want to exploit
the licensee. If the licensee supplies half the monopoly output, q¤=2; as intended, the
royalties and ¯xed fees that the licensor collects from the licensee are ¯xed. An
11
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l i c e n s o rw i l li m p o s eal o s so nt h el i c e n s e et h r o u g ht h ef a l li np r i c e ,b u tt h i si sn o th i s
concern once the agreement is in place. If the licensor increases supply, the licensor
gets all the additional revenue from the increased supply, but bears only half the cost
of the fall in price.
The prospect of such ex post opportunism undermines the licensor's ex ante
pro¯t. The licensee will rationally predict that, after the license is signed, the licensor
will supply more units than the pro¯t-maximizing number of units q¤=2; and the
market price will be lower than the pro¯t-maximizing price. The licensee realizes
that the licensor's ex post supply decision will erode his own pro¯t. The terms that
the licensee will accept at the outset will re°ect this prediction. As a consequence,
the licensor cannot charge the ¯xed fees that he could charge if he could commit to
producing only half the monopoly output, q¤=2. This is a subtle point that courts
and commentators seem to have overlooked. For example, Bowman (1973) remarks
that it \strains credulity" to think that General Electric would adopt a scheme \to
restrain its own trade in patented lamps . . ." In fact, this is exactly what General
Electric must do to ensure pro¯t neutrality.
Given that per-unit royalties and ¯xed fees do not achieve pro¯t neutrality,
additional license restrictions become necessary. We consider the following candidates:
1. Restricting the licensee's output.
2. Fixing the licensee's price.
3. Imposing a price-matching clause, as in General Electric.
4. Restricting the licensor's own output.
5. Allowing the royalty rate to decrease with the licensee's supply.
6. Allowing the royalty rate to decrease with the licensor's supply.
12
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benchmark case.
Output Restrictions. The easiest way to ¯x the problem is to allow the licensor
t oc a ph i so w no u t p u ta tq¤=2, as part of the license. Such a commitment improves
the terms of license that the licensee will agree to, since the licensee is then guaranteed
that the market price will be the monopoly price. Since the resulting license would
be pro¯t neutral with respect to the benchmark, we see nothing wrong with such a
commitment. Courts have held that restricting the licensee's output does not pose an
antitrust problem (General Talking Pictures 1938; Weinschel 2000, 2:91; Hovenkamp,
et. al., 2004, at 32:1:3), but we are unaware of any case where restricting the licensor's
output has been challenged.
Price Restrictions. As we have already pointed out, a solution to the incentive
problem is for the licensor not to produce at all, and to have two licensees. We now
ask whether the General Electric rule can also be a solution when the patent holder
has manufacturing capability. The General Electric price-¯xing exception allows the
licensor to set the price for both the licensor and the licensee.
We should say at the outset that competition is messy when prices can be
¯xed. A standard notion of competition in the study of oligopolies, also used here,
i sc o m p e t i t i o ni ns u p p l y . W i t ht h el i c e n s i n gt e r m si np l a c e ,e a c h¯ r mm a k e sa n
independent choice of supply, and the market price then adjusts to ensure that all the
units are sold. With price restrictions, that notion must be modi¯ed, since prices
are not allowed to change endogenously in order to clear the market. For example,
if the total supply exceeds demand at the ¯xed price, then ¯rms will end up with
excess supply. This should not happen in equilibrium, but in order to test whether
the supply decisions are an equilibrium, we need some notion of how output would be
rationed if a ¯rm changed its supply.
For the General Electric price-¯xing rule, we will again assume that ¯rms make
their supply decisions after the licensing terms have been set. The term of license in
General Electric speci¯ed that the licensee must charge the same price as the licensor.
13
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sell. In addition, the agreement may specify royalties and ¯xed fees. With this
agreement in place, the ¯rms choose their supplies.
We claim that the licensor can ensure the monopoly outcome by setting the
royalty to be the di®erence between the pro¯t-maximizing price and the cost of the






The ¯xed fee must be set so that the licensee's pro¯t is zero if both ¯rms produce q¤=2:
If we can show that neither ¯rm wants to deviate from half the monopoly supply, q¤=2;
then the licensor gets all the pro¯t and production is e±cient.
We will check whether either ¯rm wants to deviate from the supply q¤=2, sup-
posing that q¤=2 is the supply of the other ¯rm. Consider ¯rst the licensee: The li-
censee cannot bene¯t by reducing supply below q¤=2. Since each of the inframarginal
units provides him with revenue (price) higher than the royalty plus marginal cost, re-
ducing supply will cause him to lose revenue. (Notice that if the price could increase,
the licensee would typically want to reduce supply. A reduction would cause the price
to increase on all the inframarginal units, while the loss on the marginal unit would be
zero.) The licensee also cannot bene¯t by increasing supply above q¤=2: The licensor
is also (by hypothesis) supplying q¤=2: If the licensee increases supply, the market
will have an excess supply at price p(q¤): If the licensee does not manage to sell his
marginal units, then he has wasted the cost of producing them. If he does sell them,
he cannot cover costs, since the price is not higher than the royalty plus marginal cost
of the incremental units. That is, p(q¤) ¡ (½ + °(q)) <p (q¤) ¡ (½ + °(q¤=2)) = 0 for
q>q ¤=2.
What about the licensor? Will he also be content to supply q¤=2? Keeping
the contractual price ¯xed at p(q¤); reducing supply will not increase pro¯t; since he
gives up pro¯t in amount p(q¤) ¡ °(q) on the marginal units, which is positive for
q · q¤=2: Suppose instead that he increases supply above q¤=2: Since the price is
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by the licensee, or the marginal unit is not sold at all. If not sold, it wastes the costs
of production. If it crowds out a unit sold by the licensee, then the licensor loses the
royalty ½ on that unit. But using (3.12) and the fact that °(¢) is increasing, it follows
that ½>p (q¤) ¡ °(q)f o rq>q ¤=2; hence the licensor prefers to collect the royalty
from the licensee than to crowd out that unit and produce it himself.
This proves that with the license terms speci¯ed { a royalty that satis¯es (3.12)
and price ¯xed at p(q¤) { there is an equilibrium with pro¯t-maximizing production,
even though the licensor competes with the licensee. The licensor can collect all the
pro¯t through ¯xed fees and royalties.8
This analysis is signi¯cantly di®erent from that of Landes and Posner (2003)
who argue that price ¯xing only serves \to increase the total costs of manufacture,
to the patentee qua patentee," or Baxter (1966) who argues that price and output
restraints are counterproductive because they allow licensees to share in oligopoly
pro¯t. Licensors can recover pro¯ts by charging ¯xed fees as well as royalties.
After eighty years of court decisions and commentary, we have come to a strik-
ing conclusion: The General Electric Company endorsed one of the few rules capable
of implementing pro¯t neutrality. Its solution was also \minimalist." We argue in the
appendix (section 8.1) that General Electric could not have achieved the same result
by ¯xing the price of the licensee without ¯xing his own.
Nonlinear Royalties. Our ¯nal scheme is to consider nonlinear royalties. Of
8A slight embarrassment, however, is that, depending on how excess supply is rationed, there can
be other equilibria with the property that q1 + q2 = q¤ (where q1;q 2 are respectively the supplied
quantities of the licensor and licensee), and q2 <q ¤=2: Even if such an equilibrium exists, it will
not be preferred by either party to the equilibrium in which the ¯rms supply q1 = q2 = q¤=2: By
moving to the equilibrium with equal ouputs, the licensee bene¯ts because the price he receives on
the additional units is larger than the royalty plus marginal cost. The licensor bene¯ts because the
royalty he receives on the units transferred to the licensee is larger than the price net of costs of
his own supply. In economic games with two equilibria, where both parties prefer one equilibrium
to the other, it is easy to ensure that the better equilibrium is played. One of the players can
simply announce that he intends to play his strategy in the preferred equilibrium, and the other
player will follow. No commitments or license terms are required to implement this outcome. It is
self-enforcing.
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this form will not guarantee pro¯t neutrality when the licensor and licensee compete.
As we showed above, the licensor can pro¯t by committing himself not to
expand output beyond q1 = q¤=2 once the license is in place: His incentive to expand
output follows from the fact that he earns royalties on the licensee's output in any
case, and can earn even more pro¯t by expanding the market. Even though his
expansion reduces the market price, the licensee bears half of that loss, while the
licensor continues to collect royalties, and also sells the additional units. The problem
is that, since the licensee can predict this outcome, he will not sign a license agreement
in the ¯rst place that provides monopoly pro¯t to the licensor. Thus, the licensor can
do better by committing not to expand output once the license is in place.
Suppose that instead of imposing a ¯xed royalty, the licensor imposes a royalty
rate ½ that falls with his own output. The fall in royalty rate will punish the licensor
for expanding output, and thus creates a commitment not to do so. This will solve
the problem. In particular, let ½ be the following decreasing function of q1 :
½(q1)=q
¤ ¡ q1:
Then ½(q¤=2) = q¤=2a n d½0(¢)=¡1: The higher the licensor's output, the less royalty
he gets, and this will commit him not to increase output beyond q¤=2:
Firm 1's pro¯t is








(1 ¡ q2 + ½
0(q1)q2 ¡ °(q1))
Firm 2's pro¯t is









(1 ¡ q1 ¡ °(q2) ¡ ½(q1))
At (q1;q 2)=( q¤=2;q ¤=2); neither ¯rm has an incentive to deviate.
Of course this scheme requires that the licensor send a royalty bill to the licensee
based on the licensor's own output. It might create an enforcement nightmare for
the licensee. The licensor will always want to argue that his supply was lower than
it was, and the licensee will want to argue that it was higher.
Nonlinear royalties based on the licensee's supply are common, and at least
two courts have said that such agreements do not violate the antitrust laws (Stockham
Valves 1966; DuPont 1953). However, in the model presented here, royalties that
increase or decrease with the licensee's supply will not lead to pro¯t neutrality because
they do not punish the licensor for trying to exploit the licensee once the terms of
license are ¯xed. To punish the licensor for increasing supply beyond that to which
he would like to commit, the royalty must depend on the licensor's supply, not the
licensee's supply. William Baxter (1966) has previously analysed the role that sliding
scale royalties play in partitioning the market between two licensees, but did not
consider the case where a patent holder/manufacturer is substituted for one of the
licensees.
This is a good place to return to our inquiry about minimalism. The point of
stipulating royalties that decline with the licensor's output is to soften the competition
that the licensor provides to the licensee. It is even more direct to write license terms
that restrict the licensor's supply. Many commentators believe, on somewhat slender
case law, that U.S. law permits patent holders to impose minimum output levels on
their licensees (Weinschel 2000, 2-91; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 32:9), but we know
of no cases in which a licensor's commitment to self-restraint has been at issue.
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The Supreme Court has also considered cases where rightholders used price-¯xing
restrictions while licensing a patented enhancement to an existing product. In Ethyl
Gasoline, the patent holder had the rights to a gasoline additive (tetraethyl lead) that
raised the gasoline's octane rating. Licensed re¯ners were not allowed to sell gasoline
containing the additive to unlicensed middlemen (\jobbers") and jobbers who failed
to observe the major re¯neries' posted prices were regularly terminated for displaying
poor \business ethics." The net e®ect was to set the price at which licensed jobbers
could sell high-performance gasoline. The court struck down the jobbers' licenses on
the ground that they violated the antitrust laws.
In considering proprietary enhancements to existing goods, we will assume that
each consumer's willingness to pay for the enhanced product is larger than for the
original product by amount ¢: Applying the derived-reward principle, the inventor
should not receive more than ¢ per unit sold.
As before, we will suppose that the demand for the underlying good, say,
unenhanced gasoline, is given by a function 1 ¡ p; where p is the price, and that the
inverse demand curve is therefore given by 1 ¡ q: Suppose that the marginal cost of
a unit of unenhanced gasoline is c · 1 and that the additive increases the willingness
to pay for each unit of gasoline by ¢ · 1. Then the demand for enhanced gasoline
at price p is 1+¢¡p; and the willingness to pay for the qth unit (the inverse demand
curve) becomes p(q)=1+¢¡ q:
We will not yet make a distinction between selling the additive at a proprietary
price or licensing the right to produce gasoline that includes the additive. In both
c a s e s ,w ew i l lr e f e rt ot h ep r i c eo rr o y a l t ya s½:
Patented Enhancements to Proprietary Goods. Assume for simplicity that the
resource cost of producing the additive is zero, and the unit cost of producing gasoline
(enhanced or unenhanced) is c. In a competitive market, the cost of enhanced gasoline
will then be p = c+½ if ½ is the wholesale price of the additive or the royalty for adding
18
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of gasoline will go up by ¢; so that sales of the enhanced gasoline are the same as
without the additive. During the life of the patent, it is the patent holder rather
than user who collects the social value. This is consistent with the derived-reward
principle that the pro¯t must derive from the social value.
Further, provided the total demand for gasoline is relatively large, the licensor's
pro¯t is maximized by charging ½ = ¢ in a competitive market. No distributor would
buy the additive at a price greater than ½ =¢ ; so 0 <½· ¢: In addition, it cannot
generally be more pro¯table to charge a royalty less than ¢: The licensor's pro¯t is
½(1 + ¢ ¡ ½ ¡ c): This pro¯t increases in ½ whenever 1 + ¢ ¡ c>2½: But since
¢ ¸ ½ it is enough that 1¡c>¢: Since 1¡c is the demand for unenhanced gasoline
at the competitive price, this condition can be interpreted to mean that the licensor
will charge a royalty equal to the full value of the additive whenever the demand for
gasoline is large relative to the value of the additive.
It seems clear under the derived-reward principle that the licensor should be
allowed to pro¯t in amount ¢ per unit of gasoline sold, but not more. This is true even
if gasoline suppliers operate as oligopolists in the distribution of gasoline, rather than
as perfect competitors. Suppose, in particular, that there are only two gasoline sellers,
¯rms 1 and 2. Neither will take a license on the additive at a royalty or wholesale
price greater than ¢; since a re¯ner can sell the same amount of unenhanced gasoline
at price p ¡ ¢ as enhanced gasoline at price p. If the royalty is greater than ¢;
it is more pro¯table to sell unenhanced gasoline. This is true both of both perfect
competitors and oligopolists.
If both ¯rms license at royalty ½ and sell the enhanced gasoline, ¯rm 1 chooses
the supply q1 that maximizes pro¯t, de¯ned as follows, assuming that the supply q2
of the other ¯rm is ¯xed:
(1 + ¢ ¡ q1 ¡ q2)q1 ¡ (c + ½)q1
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(1 + ¢ ¡ q2 ¡ (c + ½))
and at the symmetric solution where q1 = q2; the ¯rms supply
q1 = q2 =
1
3
(1 + ¢ ¡ c ¡ ½) (4.1)
Thus, the licensor's pro¯t is
½ (q1 + q2)=
2
3
½(1 + ¢ ¡ c ¡ ½)
Exactly as for the competitive case, the optimum is to set ½ = ¢ provided demand is
large relative to ¢: The oligopoly price is then p (q1 + q2)=( 1 =3 ) ( 1+¢+2 c):
The oligopolist re¯ners (gasoline suppliers) earn pro¯t in the oligopoly, regard-
less of the royalty they pay; that is the nature of oligopoly. Although the licensor
would like to get its hands on that pro¯t, the licensor is not entitled to it under the
derived-reward principle. The oligopolists earn pro¯t regardless of whether there is
a product enhancement; the pro¯t earned by the oligopolists was not created by the
proprietor of the enhancement.
This analysis disagrees with the argument of Baxter (1966) that all royalties
on the sale of unpatented end-products should be banned because they allow patent
holders to \drain o® the full monopoly potential inherent not in the invention but
in the unpatented end product of which the invention is only one of many inputs."
If the additive is manufactured by the proprietor and sold to the gasoline suppliers,
there is nothing further to license, and the suppliers should not be paying royalties
under the derived-reward principle. Moreover, royalties could not be sustained unless
the licensor made rebates to compensate. Such an arrangement clearly facilitates
collusion, and, as Baxter suggests, should not be allowed. On the other hand, if
the gasoline suppliers manufacture and include the additive themselves, a royalty is
reasonable under the derived-reward principle. But again, the gasoline suppliers
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proprietor was using the licenses to facilitate collusion. If the royalty is larger than
the value to consumers of the additive, then it presumably facilitates a sham, and is
accompanied by rebates to the licensees { otherwise, they would decline the license.
To reiterate, by sham licensing we mean that the licensor uses the intellectual
property right to cartelize the market, earning pro¯t from the cartelization rather
than from the value of the invention. The most pro¯table arrangement is to keep
unenhanced gasoline o® the market and to sell the monopoly output of enhanced
gasoline, namely, the q that maximizes
(1 + ¢ ¡ q ¡ c)q
The parenthetic term is the sales price when q units of enhanced gasoline are supplied.





(1 + ¢ ¡ c) (4.2)
and the corresponding market-clearing price is
p(q




(1 + ¢ + c) (4.3)
That this is a sham is °agged by the fact that users of the enhanced gasoline pay such a
high price that they are worse o® than before the innovation. The di®erence between
the cartelized price after the innovation and the oligopoly price for unenhanced gasoline
before the innovation is (1=2)(1 + ¢ + c) ¡ (1=3)(1 + 2c); which is greater than the
consumers' willingness to pay for the di®erence in quality, ¢; for small ¢: In fact, the
easiest way to see the potential for sham licensing is to think of ¢ as close to zero.
The following license terms will support the monopoly price, provided both
gasoline distributors take the license. One can see from (4.1) and (4.2) (and anal-
ogously to our discussion in section 3.2) that a royalty of ½ =
1
2q¤ (¢) supports the
monopoly output.
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2q¤ (¢) for producing and using the additive, stipulating
that licensees cannot avoid the royalty by reverting to unenhanced gasoline.
Share the pro¯t through ¯xed fees.
2. Charge a ¯xed fee for producing and using the additive, stipulating that the
price of enhanced gasoline must be p(q¤(¢)), and stipulating that the licensees
cannot sell unenhanced gasoline. Share the pro¯t through ¯xed fees.
A cartel cannot generally be supported unless the license stipulates either that
the licensee will pay royalties on unenhanced gasoline as well as enhanced gasoline,
as in (1), or that the licensee will sell only enhanced gasoline, as in (2). Without
being bound in one of those ways, a licensee can pro¯t by selling unenhanced gasoline
at a price between the marginal cost c and the monopoly price p(q¤(¢)) ¡ ¢. That
will break the cartel. Because the license terms (1) and (2) will support a cartel, they
should not be allowed.
Of course, entry will also break the cartel. If there is always a threat of entry
by an unlicensed entrant, the market price for unenhanced gasoline must be p = c;
and the price of enhanced gasoline can be no greater than c +¢ : Higher prices will
elicit entry.
The reader will have no trouble seeing that cost reductions can be analyzed in
the same way as product enhancements. Instead of adding to the product's value,
suppose the innovation reduces the cost of manufacturing it. Whether ¢ is conceived
as a boost to the consumer's willingness to pay for the product or a reduction in the cost
of manufacturing it, the innovation would increase the consumers' surplus available in
a competitive market by ¢ per unit. For reasons analogous to the ones given here,
allowing the licensor to ¯x prices would allow him to pro¯t from cartelization rather
than pro¯ting from the social value he created, in violation of the derived-reward
principle. Instruments to ¯x the monopoly price will take the same forms as above,
e:g:; binding the licensees to pay royalties regardless of whether they use the patented
innovation, and specifying the price they must charge while preventing them from
reverting to the inferior product.
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and also in the case of cost reductions, royalties are a rich enough licensing instrument
to collect the pro¯t that Congress intended. Price-setting power is not only unneces-
sary, but allows the licensor to cartelize the market, thus earning pro¯t from a source
(the cartel) not created by the invention. This violates the derived-rewards principle.
Patented Enhancements to Patented Goods. In the previous section we sup-
posed that the original good (e.g., gasoline) was supplied in an unprotected market.
We shall now assume that the previous good is itself proprietary. In this section we
assume that the enhanced good does not infringe the previous patent, and in the next
section we assume that it does.
If the two proprietary goods are noninfringing, is there any reason to allow
licensing at all? Given that licensing is not required for productive e±ciency as
de¯ned above, and not required to bring either of the products to market, some com-
mentators have suggested that licensing is a prima facie sham (Bowman 1973; Kaplow
1984; Gi®ord 2002).
The problem, though, is that e±ciency means more than productive e±ciency.
Without licensing, one of the proprietors would supply an inferior product, presumably
at a lower price, and some of the consumers would buy it. Depending on prices,
consumers may be better o® if both ¯rms supply the better product. What licensing
terms, if any, should be allowed in order to achieve this result, without undermining
the competition between the patent holders that Congress apparently intended?
Suppose, for example, that the two ¯rms write a licensing agreement that
commits the proprietor of the inferior product, whom we shall call ¯rm 1, to stay out
of the market. Then the proprietor of the enhanced product, whom we shall call ¯rm
2, becomes a monopolist. This is presumably the most pro¯table arrangement for the
two ¯rms, and the proprietor of the better good should be willing to pay his potential
competitor to stay out. Most commentators would agree that such an arrangement
would be collusive, but how does that follow from the principles we have articulated?
What licensing terms are consistent with our principles? Can the allowable licensing
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the collusive outcome?
We claim that the only licensing arrangement consistent with the derived-
reward principle is a license from ¯rm 1 to ¯rm 2, giving the right to produce the
enhanced product in return for royalties and perhaps other fees A license from ¯rm
2 to ¯rm 1 is not consistent with that principle, since ¯rm 1 has nothing of value
to o®er ¯rm 2. Cross-licensing is not consistent with the derived-reward principle.
Further, we show that the one-way license will not allow the ¯rms to cartelize the
market. Despite the license, the price of the enhanced product will be constrained by
potential competition from the inferior product.
To make our case, we need to characterize the outcomes of three market ar-
rangements: that the patent holders compete without a license, that ¯rm 2 licenses to
¯rm 1 with royalties and perhaps ¯xed fees, and that the ¯rms ¯nd a way to support
the collusive outcome. We will show that the ¯rst two arrangements are equivalent for
consumers, but the second arrangement, one-way licensing, is more pro¯table for the
¯rms. The collusive outcome is more pro¯table still, but imposes the monopoly price
on consumers. Thus, one-way licensing achieves the objective of economic e±ciency
(all consumers consume the better good), while avoiding the collusive outcome.
Let pI be the price of the original, inferior good, and let p be the price of the
enhanced good. Then, since each user has willingness to pay ¢ for the enhancement,
prices must satisfy
p
I =m a x f0;p¡ ¢g (4.4)
With these prices, the demand for units of both products is the same as if both ¯rms
supplied the enhanced product at price p: That is, the number of units demanded
is 1 + ¢ ¡ p; but some of the units will be the inferior product, which provide less
utility in amount ¢ and sell at a price pI that is lower by ¢: For simpler calculations,
and because our focus is not on productive e±ciency, we will now assume that the
marginal cost of production is zero.
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ating its pro¯t opportunities, ¯rm 1 takes as given ¯rm 2's supply of the enhanced
good, q2. Firm 1's pro¯t as a function of its own supply of the inferior good, q,i s
(1 ¡ q ¡ q2) q (4.5)




(1 ¡ q2) (4.6)
Similarly, ¯rm 2's pro¯t is
(1 + ¢ ¡ q ¡ q2) q2 (4.7)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q) (4.8)



















We will now show that the second market arrangement, licensing from ¯rm 2
to ¯rm 1, is equivalent for consumers to competition without licensing, and better for
the patent holders. The largest royalty, ½; that would be o®ered or accepted is ½ =¢ :
At a larger royalty, ¯rm 1 would supply the inferior good rather than the enhanced
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licensing creates bene¯ts patent holders without harming consumers.
In evaluating its pro¯t opportunities, the licensee, ¯rm 1, again takes as given
¯rm 2's supply of the enhanced good, q2. Firm 1's pro¯t as a function of its own
supply of the enhanced good, q1,i s
(1 + ¢ ¡ q1 ¡ q2 ¡ ½) q1 (4.9)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q2 ¡ ½) (4.10)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q1) (4.11)








(1 + ¢ + ½)
Therefore the price will be
1
3
(1 + ¢ + ½): (4.12)
Total output of the enhanced good will be
1
3
(2(1 + ¢) ¡ ½)
The sum of the two ¯rms' pro¯t is
1
9
(1 + ¢ + ½)(1 + ¢ + ½ +1+¢¡ 2½)=
1
9





2 + ½(1 + ¢) ¡ ½
2)
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the price of the enhanced good is the same with and without licensing, namely 1
3(1 +
2¢): This accounts for our claim that consumers are as well o® with licensing as




2 + ¢) (4.13)
which is larger than their pro¯t in competition with each other, in the absence of a
license.
We now compare to the collusive outcome, namely, the outcome if ¯rm 1 re-
nounces its right to supply the inferior product. The monopoly price and quantity of





The collusive pro¯t (4.14) is larger than the pro¯t (4.13) available with one-way li-
censing, and the price of the enhanced good is also higher,
1
2(1 + ¢) >
1
3(1 + 2¢);
i nt h ec a s e( ¢< 1) where the possibility of supplying the inferior good is actually a
constraint in the market:
We conclude that the one-way license allows the proprietor to pro¯t from the
social value of the enhancement without pro¯ting from cartelizing the market. This
is the only type of license that should be allowed under our principles. In contrast, a
cross-license of the type discussed in the next section would allow the two ¯rms to earn
monopoly pro¯ts as if the proprietor of the enhancement created the whole market.
Blocking Patents on Enhancements. We continue using the same model, but
now assume that the enhanced product infringes the patent on the original product,
so the patent holders have blocking patents. This was the situation in Line Material
(1948). Since the enhanced product infringes the patent on the inferior product,
the knowledge created by the ¯rst innovator was presumptively required to develop
it. In this sense, the net value of the enhanced product is presumptively part of the
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incremental costs. By the derived-reward principle, the ¯rst innovator is entitled to
pro¯t from it.
There are not many possibilities for how to resolve the blocking patents so that
the enhanced product can come to market. They include:
(1) Consolidate ownership of the patents (one patent holder sells to the
other).
(2) Allow the patent holders to cross license the enhanced product, each
paying royalties to the other.
(3) Allow the patent holders to cross license with royalties, ¯xing the
price of the enhanced good, and stipulating that the inferior good will not
compete in the market.
(4) Force the patent holders to cross license without royalties.
We assume that (4) is not what Congress had in mind, as it leads to the same
market outcome as if the patents were not blocking, discussed in section 4.2.9 We now
show that (2) and (3) are equivalent to (1), provided that the cost of manufacturing
the enhanced good is the same regardless of how the manufacturing is divided between
the ¯rms. However, echoing our discussion of section 2, (2) is not equivalent to (1) or
(3) if the manufacturing must be divided in a particular way to achieve cost e±ciencies.
Since the enhancement adds ¢ to every user's willingness to pay, the inverse
demand curve can again be written as p(q)=1+¢¡ q,w h e r eq is the quantity
supplied of the enhanced good, and the inferior good is not supplied. The most
9Although this seems self-evident to us, Line Material (1948, 311) concludes the opposite in a series
o fr e m a r k st h a ts t r i k eu sa sw r o n gi nm a n yw a y s :\ W h e r et w oo rm o r ep a t e n t e e sw i t hc o m p e t i t i v e ,
noninfringing patents combine them and ¯x prices on all devices produced under any of the patents,
competition is impeded to a greater degree than where a single patentee ¯xes prices for his licensees.
The struggle for pro¯t is less acute. Even when, as here, the devices are not commercially competitive
because the subservient patent cannot be practiced without consent of the dominant, the statement
holds good. The stimulus to seek competitive inventions is reduced by the mutually advantageous
price-¯xing arrangement."
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¯rst assume that the marginal cost of producing both goods is the same, and for
simplicity, that the marginal cost is zero. Then any manufacturing arrangement is
equally cost-e±cient.
C l e a r l yt h em a x i m u mp r o ¯ tc a nb ea c h i e v e di fb o t hp a t e n t e dg o o d sa r eo w n e d
by a single ¯rm (solution (1)). What we will now show is that it can also be achieved
by cross licensing with royalties (solution (2)), but only if the previous patent holder,
whom we again call ¯rm 1, can either renounce his right to supply the inferior product,
or pays a low enough royalty that he has no incentive to supply it.
Assume that the cross license on the enhanced good provides for royalties in
amounts (½1;½ 2); with each ¯rm paying the other: We will show that in order to
sustain the pro¯t maximizing price, these royalties must satisfy
½1 + ½2 =
1
2
(1 + ¢) (4.15)
Further, in order to dissuade ¯rm 1 from undercutting the market by supplying the
inferior product as well, it must hold that ½1 · ¢: However this constraint imposes
no harm provided the cost of aggregate supply does not depend on how the supply
is divided between the ¯rms. That is, it imposes no harm if there is no issue of
productive e±ciency.
With the royalties in place, and assuming that ¯rm 1 does not supply the
inferior good, the ¯rms will choose their most pro¯table supplies, (q1;q 2); realizing
that the price in the market will satisfy
p(q1 + q2)=1+¢¡ q1 ¡ q2:
Taking as given the royalties (½1;½ 2) and the supply q2 of ¯rm 2, ¯rm 1's pro¯t function
is
(p(q1 + q2) ¡ ½1) q1 =( 1+¢¡ q1 ¡ q2 ¡ ½1)q1 (4.16)
10If users value the enhancement di®erently, it could be more pro¯table to sell both products as a
form of price discrimination.
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(1 + ¢ ¡ q2 ¡ ½1) (4.17)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q1 ¡ ½2) (4.18)
Adding (4.17) and (4.18), it follows that the aggregate equilibrium supply q1 + q2
satis¯es
q1 + q2 =
2
3




But since the objective is to choose the royalties such that the equilibrium quantities
satisfy




(1 + ¢); (4.19)
the condition (4.15) must be satis¯ed.
Further, by (4.17), (4.18), and solving ½1 from (4.15), we can write the equilib-
rium supplies as




(1 + ¢) ¡ ½1
These are the ¯rms' respective supplies if the royalties satisfy (4.15) and the inferior
product is not supplied.







(1 + ¢) ¡ 2½1)+½1
µ1
2
(1 + ¢) ¡ ½1
¶
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2(1 +¢));
¯rm 1 supplies the whole market and earns all the pro¯t. Thus, by choosing the
royalties within the range ½1 2 (0;¢); there is scope for dividing pro¯t even without
using ¯xed fees.
Thus, if the two ¯rms have the same constant marginal cost of supply, we can
conclude that there is a cross licensing arrangement that sustains the maximum pro¯t.
In this arrangement,
² each ¯rm pays a royalty to the other on the units of the enhanced products it
sells;
² the royalty paid by the previous patent holder is positive, but possibly smaller
than the royalty paid by the improver;
² the previous patent holder has no incentive to undermine the monopoly on the
enhanced product by selling the inferior product;
² the pro¯ts can be divided arbitrarily by using ¯xed fees as well as royalties.
We thus conclude that when manufacturing costs are the same regardless of
which ¯rm supplies the market, a cross-licensing agreement is pro¯t neutral with
respect to the benchmark solution (1) of allowing the patent holders to consolidate
their patent rights. By the minimalist principle, there is no need to allow price ¯xing in
addition to royalties, and the decision against price-¯xing in Line Material is therefore
consistent with our principles, even though the reasoning in the case is, in our view,
misguided (see footnote 9).
This may change, however, if each ¯rm's marginal cost of production is increas-
ing, or if the ¯rms have di®erent marginal costs of production. In that case there is
an issue of productive e±ciency as in section 3, so royalties and ¯xed fees may not be
pro¯t neutral. Pro¯ts may be higher under solution (1) than (2).
If, for example, the enhancer has lower (constant) marginal costs of production,
the only e±cient arrangement is for ¯rm 2 to supply the whole market. The royalties
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f o r¯ r m2a n dh i g hf o r¯ r m1 . B u ti f½1 > ¢; ¯rm 1 has an incentive to enter the
market with the inferior product, competing against ¯rm 2, and depressing its price.
Cross-licensing to manufacture and produce the enhanced product does not prevent
this, even though both ¯rms would be better o® preventing it.
When productive e±ciency is at issue, royalties and ¯xed fees may not be
enough instruments to ensure (i) that the output is manufactured e±ciently, (ii) that
the market price is pro¯t-maximizing, and (iii) that the inferior product stays o® the
market. In fact, for relatively large values of ¢; cross licensing will result in one of
the following problems.
1. Manufacturing costs are unnecessarily high due to unequal production in the
¯rms, and therefore the ¯rms earn less than the maximum pro¯t.
2. Manufacturing is e±cient, but the ¯rms earn less than the maximum pro¯t
because the royalties are too low.
3. The ¯rms earn less than the maximum pro¯t because the inferior product is also
on the market.
To see this more formally, modify the above model so that the marginal costs
of manufacturing are given by a function °(¢), as in section 2 above, and for simplicity,

















¤ (¢)) = 1 + ¢ ¡ q
¤(¢)
The optimum clearly requires equal production in the two ¯rms. To support equal
production, the royalties must be equal, ½1 = ½2: However, to prevent the ¯rst patent
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the appendix (section 8.2), we show that the royalties required to support the pro¯t
maximizing price are
½1 = ½2 =
1
4







However, if ½2 = ½1 > ¢; these will not sustain the pro¯t maximum, since ¯rm
1 will supply the inferior product instead of the enhanced product, thus depriving ¯rm
2 of royalties. The condition (4.22) may be inconsistent with ½2 = ½1 · ¢i f¢>
1
3
and costs ° are relatively low: There are several ways to solve these problems, but
they may require terms of license beyond cross licensing the enhanced product. Two
possibilities are
1. (Exclusive dealing) Write into the terms of license that ¯rm 1 will not supply
the inferior product, and write royalty rates that satisfy (4.22). Distribute the
p r o ¯ tw i t h¯ x e df e e s .
2. (Price Fixing) Set the royalty for the enhanced good at ½2 = p(q¤(¢))¡° (q¤=2)
and ¯x the price for both ¯rms at p(q¤(¢)):
Exclusive dealing is generally treated under rule of reason (see the 1995 An-
titrust Guidelines for Licensing Intellectual Property, section 5.4). Our suggestion is
that, by the neutrality principle, exclusive dealing of this type should be per se legal,
especially if the second solution remains per se illegal under Line Material.I n a n y
case, whether the second solution will keep the inferior good o® the market depends
on the costs of producing the inferior good. Any unit if the inferior good that is
supplied will either remain unsold due to rationing at the ¯xed price, or will crowd
out a sale of the enhanced good by one of the ¯rms. If the unit remains unsold,
then producing it is clearly unpro¯table, so suppose that it crowds out a sale of the
enhanced good. The marginal unit can provide no more than [p(q¤(¢)) ¡ ¢] ¡ ~ °(0)
as pro¯t; where ~ °(0) is the marginal cost of the ¯rst unit of the inferior good. The
pro¯t provided by the crowded-out unit is p(q¤(¢)) ¡°(q¤=2), whether it would have
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lost royalty.) Provided that the cost ~ °(0) is greater than °(q¤=2)¡¢; the unit is less
pro¯table than the enhanced good it crowded out.
5. Possible Per Se Rules
This section suggests three possible per se rules that follow from the three principles,
and discusses some of their advantages and disadvantages:
1 . P a t e n tl i c e n s e sb a s e do nac o m b i n a t i o no f( p o s i t i v e )¯ x e df e e sa n dp e r - u n i t
royalties are presumptively lawful.
2. Patent licenses that (a) require the licensee to observe minimum prices,
(b) require the licensee to observe quantity limits, or (c) reduce the licensee's per
unit royalties as licensor output increases are presumptively lawful in cases where
the rightholder supplies part of the market directly. Plainti®s can overcome this
presumption by producing evidence that a given license is a sham designed to immunize
transactions that violate the derived-reward principle.
3. Cross licenses between holders of blocking patents that (a) require the
parties to observe minimum prices, (b) require the parties to observe quantity limits, or
(c) reduce the parties' per unit royalties as licensor output increases are presumptively
lawful. Plainti®s can overcome this presumption by producing evidence that a given
license is a sham designed to immunize transactions that violate the derived-reward
principle.
These proposed rules require additional comment:
First, the rules reduce but do not eliminate uncertainty for licensors. They are
based on certain presumptions, as are most per se rules created by courts (Areeda
& Hovenkamp, 2003) and commentators (Baxter 1966; Adelman & Juenger 1975;
Kaplow 1984), and the presumptions can be challenged. The main danger is that
challenges may succeed because judges may be too willing to suspect sham agreements.
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that price restrictions (or licenses more generally) were economically irrational, and
could therefore only have collusive intent (Baxter 1966; Adelman & Juenger 1975).
Contrary to this view, we have shown that licenses in general, and price restrictions in
particular, can be e±cient without being collusive, which signi¯cantly undercuts the
case for suspicion. Thus, courts should normally uphold the presumption that licenses
are pro-competitive absent substantial evidence that royalties exceed the value of the
defendant's invention or other circumstances that clearly point to collusion.11
Second, our conclusions follow from a standard, but nevertheless speci¯c, eco-
nomic model about how licensors and licensees behave { namely, that they engage
in quantity competition. However, the intuition behind the productive ine±ciency
that is remedied by price restrictions is more robust than the model. The productive
ine±ciency arises because the licensor perceives a lower marginal cost of production
than the licensee, and will produce too much relative to the licensee. It is hard to
see how any form of competition between the licensor and licensee would change this
conclusion when marginal cost is increasing, although all per se rules can be rebutted
with new and convincing arguments. But even if a plainti® succeeds in ¯nding such a
model, he would have to adduce evidence that it applies; otherwise there should be a
strong presumption that licensing restrictions to remedy the problem are appropriate.
Third, more complicated models might render our results ambiguous. For
example, some commentators have argued that rightholders cannot use licenses e®ec-
tively because of limited information about licensees' cost functions, current market
demand, and/or future demand (Landes & Posner 2003; Adelman & Juenger 1975).12
On the other hand, courts' \inability to ¯nd all the relevant facts" is a traditional
justi¯cation for having per se rules in the ¯rst place (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2003).
Plainti®s who advance these alternative arguments should produce the evidence or
11Such circumstances might include that the property right is likely invalid or that it can easily be
avoided by \inventing around" (Adelman and Juenger, 1975).
12To the contrary, Landes & Posner (2003) invoke these factors as a possible justi¯cation for
General Electric-style price restrictions. In our view, these disagreements show the need for economic
modeling.
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Fourth, our focus on productive e±ciency does not exhaust the licensing land-
scape. Some commentators argue that licensing undermines the incentive to challenge
a bad patent, since it creates collusion between otherwise competitors (Landes & Pos-
ner 2003; Adelman & Juenger 1975; Shapiro 2003; Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley,
2004). This argument is not actually about the patent/antitrust boundary, since it
goes to the proper functioning of the patent system itself. Scholars also argue that
cross licensing should be permitted in cases where it is needed to save transactions
costs or suppress wasteful patent races (Landes & Posner 2003).
Fifth, although the minimalism principle would allow courts to strike down un-
necessary restrictions in licenses, it says nothing about whether some other, completely
di®erent, bundle of restrictions would impose even fewer burdens on the economy. It
may be di±cult for judges to compare licenses against practices not before the court
(Kaplow 1984).
Sixth, many commentators think the main defect of per se rules as compared
to rule of reason is that per se rules eliminate a court's ability to ¯ne-tune patent
rewards based on cost of development. However such ¯ne-tuning might be too di±cult
in practice (Kaplow 1984). More importantly, Congress has created a one-size-¯ts-all
patent system, and it is the job of Congress, not the job of courts, to improve on it.
6. Rule of Reason
In general, rule of reason and per se rules like the one stated in General Electric lead
to di®erent outcomes. Rule of reason permits the court to treat a given license term
di®erently in di®erent circumstances. Rule of reason seems tautologically better, since
a court can always choose to follow the per se rule except where improvement seems
possible. However, this overlooks the di±culty of ¯nding the principles that rule of
reason should implement, and the di±culty of implementing them. Here, we discuss
what rule of reason might mean in the patent-antitrust context.
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principle.13 The most ambitious attempt to enunciate principles is due to Kaplow
(1984). He argues that Congress implicitly encoded its judgment about the optimal
balance of ex ante and ex post e±ciency in the pro¯t-to-deadweight-loss ratio implied
by the rights that were granted, in particular, patent life. A licensing restriction should
be acceptable to the court if it generates a pro¯t-to-deadweight-loss ratio larger than
that which Congress has implicitly accepted. This view removes from the court the
thorny question of how much reward an innovator should receive, at least directly.
The optimal reward is implicitly established in the pro¯t-to-deadweight-loss ratio.
Although the pro¯t-to-deadweight-loss ratio is a sensible economic criterion, it
is hard to implement. Contrary to Kaplow, it cannot be inferred from duration. If
markets are stable over time, the pro¯t-to-deadweight loss ratio is constant when the
patent life is increased from, say, nineteen to twenty years. However, it may be possible
to infer Congress's preferences in other ways, such as by its choice of breadth.14
Kaplow concedes that any practical application of the ratio test is \quite com-
plex." Given that the required information \will not generally be available," court
decisions \must inevitably be speculative."15 He concludes that \any careful attempt
to resolve patent-antitrust issues will be far more complex than has previously been
realized" and that fact reveals the \insu±ciency of prior formulations by courts and
commentators." Scholars in the past twenty years have done little to change this
assessment.
13For example, the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission say that the bene¯ts
of allowing the licensor \to exploit its [intellectual] property as e±ciently and e®ectively as possible,"
must outweigh the harm to competition (1995 Antitrust Guidelines). The problem with this approach
is that it fails to specify how courts should balance ex post deadweight loss against ex ante incentives
to innovate.
14The ratio test was revived by authors studying patent breadth; see chapter 4 of Scotchmer (2005)
for a summary.
15In practice, Kaplow admits that it is probably impossible to estimate Congress's subjective
cost/bene¯t judgment by analyzing the patent statutes. He therefore proposes a less ambitious use
of his ratio called cost-e®ectiveness. This procedure asks judges to reshu²e the law by making
currently permitted licenses with low ratios illegal in exchange for legalizing currently prohibited
practices with high ratios. Kaplow concedes, however, that even this more modest project may not
be possible given current uncertainty about the \economic e®ects of various restrictive practices."
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consumer welfare will face the same practical and theoretical di±culties identi¯ed
by Kaplow. Given Kaplow's pessimistic forecast as to whether the ratio test can be
implemented, the more likely approach seems that implied by the Antitrust Guidelines,
requiring judges to weigh de novo the value of rewards (ex ante e±ciency) against the
value of competition (ex post e±ciency) in each case. But this opens up a host of
inquiries. Should the court naively determine the necessary reward based on the
actual costs of the patent holder? Should the factual inquiry about costs instead
consider that some other inventor could have achieved the patent more cheaply, and
that too much reward only encourages waste? Should the inquiry consider that research
is risky, and that a discoverer would only have invested if he expected a super-reward
for success? Given that the research endeavor was eventually successful, what evidence
could be adduced to show that it might not have been, and with what probability?
The ways that such an inquiry can go astray are almost endless, as noted by
other commentators. First, the factual inquiry is so complex as to be unavoidably
speculative, and may defer to ideological prejudice. Baxter (1966) argues that the
weighing of proper rewards is \peculiarly appropriate" to the political branches of
government.16 Of course, one can argue that judges' opinions do not matter provided
that Congress has a chance to correct them. But this is only true if Congress has
a perfect ability to monitor and correct actions it disagrees with. In practice, most
judicial attempts to weigh ex ante and ex post e±ciency will never be reviewed, much
less corrected.
Second, any such inquiry requires specialized knowledge, and is likely to be
lengthy and complex. Landes and Posner (2003) argue that the ex ante/ex post
tradeo® is better dealt with by legislatures and executive agencies. Kaplow (1984) is
more optimistic, observing that the required analysis \is probably more developed at
both the theoretical and empirical levels than is the analysis of a vast array of other
16Balancing innovation against e±ciency also requires making normative judgments about inter-
generational transfers. Judges have no objective standards for deciding \whether, in any given case,
it would be desirable to sacri¯ce more or less consumer satisfaction of other wants by devoting more
or fewer resources to the promotion of innovation." (Bork 1977)
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Third, the inquiry will almost always depend on parties and evidence not before
the court. Except when the government is a party or citizens ¯le amicus briefs, the
interests of third parties will almost always be underrepresented. However, there is
reason to suspect that many patent agreements derive their value \precisely because
they are injurious to third persons." (Baxter 1966) The temptation to impose costs
on third parties { who are seldom in a position to know, let alone complain { may be
overwhleming.
Fourth, permitting judges to set the balance each time they decide a case will
inevitably make patent rewards less certain (Bork 1977; Adelman & Juenger 1975).
Inventors will demand a larger reward { with greater attendant deadweight loss { for
any given level of inventive e®ort (Gi®ord 2002).
Fifth, courts almost always examine controversies ex post whereas legislatures
and executive agencies tend to make policy ex ante. Since the particular innovation
before the court cannot be un-invented, there may be a built-in bias toward addressing
antitrust issues at the expense of innovation. More broadly, judges may conclude that
their judgment in a single case cannot possibly a®ect innovation in the broader society.
Nevertheless, the aggregate e®ect of court decisions will likely be substantial.
7. Conclusion
Subsequent case law has made the General Electric price-¯xing exception quite narrow.
Critics have cited this fact to argue that the price-¯xing exception is therefore a
discredited \vestige." We disagree. Based on the analysis above, a narrow price-
¯xing exception is exactly what is required by the three principles of derived-reward,
pro¯t-neutrality and minimalism. Licensing terms that are more restrictive than
royalties and ¯xed fees are only justi¯ed where a licensor and licensee compete with
one another, including where they cross license blocking patents.
The analysis in this paper is more favorable to principled per se analysis than is
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uncertainty and reduce Congress's control over patent incentives. Uncertainty, in turn,
makes patent holders reluctant to write creative license terms and chills their ability
to exploit patented knowledge. On the positive side, rule of reason potentially lets
judges tailor rewards to individual circumstances. However, the required inquiry is
so inherently speculative that °exibility may not lead to any net improvement.
We do not suggest that our three principles will give guidance in every licensing
situation. But where they apply, such as in the core patent/antitrust cases of the
twentieth century that we have discussed, they reduce the inquiry to a simple economic
question. Courts may occasionally have stumbled over the economics, but their
approach to licensing, which we interpret to be based on our three principles, seems
sounds.
8. Appendix:
8.1. Fixing a Licensee's Price, but not the Licensor's Price
We showed in section 3.1 that General Electric restores pro¯t neutrality by ¯xing the
licensee's price to match the licensor's price. Here we show that it is not enough
simply to specify a price for the licensee, without committing the licensor to the same
price.
To support the monopoly pro¯t, the stipulated price will have to be p(q¤); and
the equilibrium supplies will have to be q1 = q2 = q¤=2: Supposing that q2 = q¤=2the
royalty must be (3.12) in order to ensure that q1 = q¤=2. Then, since the licensee
cannot charge a price higher than p(q¤); he has no incentive to cut supply in order to
raise the market price. And he has no incentive to increase supply, since he would
then pay more in royalties and costs than the price of the marginal unit.
Thus, the price-¯x will ensure that the licensee supplies the optimal quantity,
q¤=2. However, it is still not easy to control the licensor's incentive to be opportunistic.
With a ¯xed price for the licensee, the licensor wants to increase supply beyond q¤=2,
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De¯ning the licensor's pro¯t function will now be a little trickier because of
the out-of-equilibrium rationing problem. To test whether q1 = q2 = q¤=2i sa n
equilibrium, the licensor must hypothesize what will happen if he increases or decreases
his own supply. If he deviates in supply, there will be two prices in the market. If the
licensor cuts supply, so that aggregate supply is less than q¤; the licensor's supply price
will be higher than p(q¤); while the licensee's price is ¯xed at p(q¤): If the licensor
increases supply, his supply will be sold at a price lower than p(q¤), while the licensee
sells at p(q¤):
Regardless of a buyer's willingness to pay, he would rather buy a cheaper unit
than a more expensive unit, and therefore the cheaper units will have to be rationed
among buyers. We assume that all of the cheaper units are sold, but that some of the
higher-priced supply might remain unsold. A customer might buy from the higher-
priced ¯rm if he cannot get a lower-priced unit, but only if his willingness to pay is
above the higher price. But if most of the customers with relatively high willingness
to pay manage to buy from the lower-priced ¯rm, then the only remaining customers
for the higher-priced ¯rm are those with lower willingness to pay, who may choose
instead to stay out of the market. Thus, the number of units that the higher-priced
¯rm sells depends on the rationing rule.
It is clear that the licensor will not want to cut his supply below q¤=2; because he
would not want to do this even if he could sell all his units at the higher price required
to clear the market, p(q1 +q2)=p(q1 +q¤=2). Using (3.2), pro¯t is increasing with q1
at q1 = q¤=2. Thus, for reducing the supply instead of increasing it (dq1 < 0i n s t e a d
of dq1 > 0); pro¯t will decrease. The worry, as in the previous section, is not that the
licensor will want to cut supply, but that he will want to increase it.
If the licensor increases supply, he will be the lower-priced ¯rm selling all his
units. However, the licensee may not sell all his units. We will describe the rationing
rule by a decreasing (or nonincreasing) di®erentiable function ^ q2:[ q¤=2;1) ! [0;q¤=2]
where ^ q2(q1) is the number of units that the licensee can sell if he produces q¤=2 units
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which means that demand is exactly met if both ¯rms produce q¤=2, selling at the
market-clearing price p(q¤): Since ^ q2 is decreasing with q1; ^ q2(q1) · q¤=2; as is logically
necessary, since the licensee cannot sell more than he produces. The assumption that
the licensees' sales, ^ q2; are decreasing with q1 re°ects rationing. If there are more
lower-priced units, there will be more consumers with high willingness to pay ¯nding
them, and that cuts into the licensee's sales. By increasing supply and selling lower-
priced units, the licensor crowds out sales by the licensee.
Two special cases are complete crowding out, so that
d^ q2(q1)
dq1 = ¡1; and no
crowding out, so that
d^ q2(q1)
dq1 =0 :
Then the licensor's pro¯t function is the following:
^ ¼
1(q1;q 2)=p(q1 +^ q2 (q1))q1 + ½^ q2 (q1) ¡
Z q1
0
°(^ q)d^ q (8.1)
=( 1 ¡ q1 ¡ ^ q2 (q1))q1 + ½^ q2 (q1) ¡
Z q1
0
°(^ q)d^ q (8.2)
=( 1 ¡ q1)q1 ¡ (q1 ¡ ½)^ q2 (q1) ¡
Z q1
0
°(^ q)d^ q (8.3)
Taking the derivative with respect to q1;
@^ ¼1(q1;q 2)
@q1




Evaluating at q1 = q2 = q¤=2; and using (3.12) and (3.2), the derivative is zero in the
extreme case of complete crowding out,
d^ q2(q1)
dq1 = ¡1; but otherwise positive. Even
with the ¯xed price, the licensor will behave opportunistically in increasing supply.
The problem cannot be solved by making the royalty ½ larger, since the licensee would
not then be willing to produce q¤=2 units.
In the special case of complete crowding out, the ¯xed-price license can support
the pro¯t maximum. With complete crowding out, the licensor is punished for his
supply deviation by losing a lot of royalty revenue. However complete crowding will
be unlikely. It essentially means that all the customers with lower willingness to
pay who could have been brought into the market by the licensor's increased supply
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This would not happen with random assignment of customers to ¯rms.
8.2. Cross Licensing when ¯rms have increasing marginal cost
We augment section 4, showing why royalties must satisfy (4.22) in order for the
cross license to support the monopoly price for the enhanced good, assuming that the
inferior product is not supplied. Taking as given the royalties (½1;½ 2) and ¯rm 2's
supply, q2, ¯rm 1's pro¯t, as a function of its own supply q1;is
µ










(1 + ¢ ¡ q2 ¡ ½1 ¡ °(q1)) (8.4)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q1 ¡ ½2 ¡ °(q2)) (8.5)
By adding (4.17) and (4.18), setting q1 = q2 =
1
2q¤(¢); it follows that
q1 + q2 =
2
3
(1 + ¢) ¡
1
3


















Adelman, M. J. 1977. \Use of Property as Clandestine Cartel." American Journal of
Comparative Law 30:271-297.
Adelman, M.J. & Juenger, F.K. 1967. Patent-Antitrust: Patent Dynamics and Field-of-
Use Licensing, New York University Law Review, 50:273-308
Areeda, P., and H. Hovenkamp. 2003. Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles
and Their Application. New York: Aspen Publishers.
Arthur J. Schmitt Foundation v. Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 893
(ND Ala. 1966).
Baxter, W. 1966. Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, Yale Law Journal 76:267-370
Bork, R. 1965. \The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division." Yale Law Journal 74:775-84.
Bork, R. 1978. The Antitrust Paradox. New York: Basic Books.
Bowman, W, Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal (University of
Chicago Press 1973.
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 US 29, 85 S.Ct. 176, 13 L.Ed.2d 99 (1964).
Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
Chisum, D.S. 2001. Chisum on Patents: A Treatise on the Law of Patentability, Validity
and Infringement. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney.
E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 US 70, 22 S.Ct. 747, 46 L.Ed. 1058
(1902).
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. US, 309 US 436, 60 S.Ct. 618, 84 L.Ed. 852 (1940)
44
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressGeneral Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 US 124, 59 S.Ct. 116, 83
L.Ed 81 (1938).
Gi®ord, D. J. 2002. \The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface: An Emerging Solu-
tion to an Intractable Problem." Hofstra Law Review 31:398-418.
Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967)
Hovenkamp, H., Janis, M., and Lemley, M.A. 2004, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of
Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law. New York: Aspen Publish-
ers.
Interstate Circuit v. US, 306 US 208, 59 S.Ct. 467, 83 L.Ed. 610 (1939).
Kaplow, L. 1984. \The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal." Harvard Law
Review 97:1813-1892
Landes, D. and R. Posner. 2003. The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Loftis et. al. (eds.), The 1995 Federal Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property: Commentary and Text (American Bar Assn. 1996)
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. 15 U.S.P.Q. 2d 113 (N.D.Ill 1990).
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 US 661, 64 S.Ct. 268, 88 L.Ed.
376 (1944)
Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 US 488, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86 L.Ed. 363 (1942).
Patterson, M. 2002. \When is Property Intellectual: The Leveraging Problem." Southern
California Law Review 73:1133-1160
Royal Industries v. St. Regis Paper Co., 420 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1969).
Schlicher,W. 2002. Patent Law: Legal and Economic Principles. Eagan MN: Thom-
son/West.
45
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art73Scotchmer, S. 1991. \Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law." Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:29-41.
Scotchmer, S. 2005. Innovation and Incentives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shapiro, C. 2003. \Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements." RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 34:391-411.
Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636 (D.Md. 1979).
Taussig, F. W. 1916. \Price Maintenance." Supplement to American Economic Review
6:170-1721.
USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
U.S. v. Line Material Co. 333 US 287, 68 S.Ct. 550, 92 L.Ed. 701 (1948)
U.S. v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192, 71 L.Ed. 362 (1926).
U.S. v. Univis Lens Co. Inc. 316 U.S. 241; 62 S. Ct. 1088; 86 L. Ed. 1408 (1942).
U.S. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. 1995. \Antitrust Guidelines
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property." Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission.
Weinschel, A.J. 2000, Antitrust-Intellectual Property Handbook (Glasser LegalWorks, Lit-
tle Falls N.J.)
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Bulldog Electrict Prods. Co., 179 F.2d 139 (4th Cir.
1950).
White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in Hearings before the
Special Subcommittee on Small Business, H Res. 66, vol. 1 1969, Oct. 7-9).
46
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press